Reel 17427 - Page 1674

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Title

Reel 17427 - Page 1674

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Character Count: 2271
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Source

https://image-uab.canadiana.ca/iiif/2/69429%2Fc07m04012q0v/full/max/0/default.jpg

Date

1941/1945

Rights

Public Domain

Format

image/jpeg

Language

fra

Text Item Type Metadata

Text

Shanghai (MISSAUTIER)
Vichy (Colonies)
23 July 1944
PBU

No 150-151 (2 parts complete)

1 Part. I refer to your telegram no 92 of 4 July.

1. There is only an artificial relation between the buying-power of the dollar, which is lower every day, and the franc, the rate of which is fixed by the Ministry of Finance at varying intervals. No foreign currency is quoted officially. Even the Japanese Military yen has been withdrawn from circulation for a year.

For your information: (1) Since the telegraphic exchange rate is 1 Swiss franc for 18 French francs, and 1 Swiss franc for 150 CRB dollars, the rate of the dollar should be 0.15 francs. (2) Since the American dollar is quoted at 500 CRB on the black market, which has a direct influence on the price of merchandise (whereas in December 1941 its official value was 45.80 francs), the rate of the CRB dollar should be 0.08 francs.

No other currency than the CRB can at present be used to serve as a basis for study of the rise in the cost of living; the only possible term of comparison is the actual selling price of goods on the black market, seeing that it is impossible to procure goods, even those of prime necessity, at ration prices. For example: (1) The Japanese Embassy has recently suppressed the small monthly allowance of rise granted until now to the French troops in Shanghai at the regulated price of 17,125 dollars per ton. Following my demarches the Embassy refers me to the black market, where the price regularly received is 150,000 dollars per ton. (2) It is impossible to obtain coal at the fixed ration price of 1500 dollars per ton; one is obliged to pay 40,000 per ton in order to get any.

Granting that the growing scarcity of merchandise is due in large part to the state of war, which is responsible for the almost complete cutting-off of supply lines, the reasons for the very serious disorganization of local markets are numerous and cannot all be presented in this telegram.

Among other reasons are these: requisitions by the Army of Occupation, the difficulties confronting the Japanese authorities in limiting the hoarding and the speculation on a large scale which the Chinese population goes in for, profiting by the economic unrest.

(continued)

File: D-5301

Examination Unit